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Abstract
Policies that encourage recycling may be used to reduce environmental costs from
waste disposal when direct restrictions on disposal are difficult to enforce. Four recycling
policies have been advanced: (i) taxes on the use of virgin materials; (ii) deposit/refund
programs; (iii) subsidies to recycled material production; and (iv) recycled content stan-
dards. This study analyzes the structure of these policies and ranks them in terms of the
private costs necessary to achieve a given reduction in disposal. The policies are then
examined in the empirical context of the recycling of lead from automobile batteries.
Elasticities for primary and secondary lead supply and demand are estimated in order
to simulate the effects of lead recycling programs. The results suggest that price-based
policy mechanisms can be successful in increasing lead recovery and that the difference
in efficiency between the four approaches is substantial.
SI would like to thank Howard Chang, Franklin Fisher, Jerry Hausman, Paul Joskow,
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A number of environmental policy issues concern costs from the disposal of materials.
Although the direct policy response to such environmental costs is to impose fees or quantity
restrictions on disposal, these measures may prove extraordinarily difficult to enforce and may
even exacerbate environmental damage by encouraging illegal dumping. The government
can respond to these difficulties with policies designed to increase recycling of materials.
Possible targets for recycling policies include industrial waste and also wastes generated by
households, which may pose greater enforcement difficulties. Hazardous household wastes,
like used automobile oil, chlorofluorocarbons in refrigerators, or batteries, are of particular
concern, but nonhazardous household wastes, such as newspapers and plastics, may also fall
into this category.2
Several studies have examined the general problem of restricting undesirable emissions
when a direct Pigouvian tax on these emissions is impossible." In the case of a disposal exter-
nality with inexpensive recycling, a special set of taxes and subsidies become available that
discourage disposal by inducing recycling. This paper examines several policies that incor-
porate these recycling incentives: (i) taxes on the use of virgin materials; (ii) deposit/refund
programs, familiar from bottle bills; (iii) subsidies for recycling; and (iv) recycled content
standards, which require recycled materials to compose a certain fraction of products. Al-
though many policies of this kind are under consideration at both federal and state levels, few
studies offer guidance to policy-makers in choosing among them.4
In this paper, I examine public policies for recycling of lead from automobile batteries.
All four recycling policies have been advanced for lead-acid vehicle batteries in response to
the health and environmental risks posed by battery disposal. Several states rely on de-
posit/refunds on vehicle batteries: Rhode Island implemented a $5 deposit/refund in 1988,
2A survey of waste disposal issues and policy responses can be found in Stavins (1991) and Office of
Technology Assessment (1989).
3For example, Diamond (1973), Green and Sheshinski (1976), and Sandmo (1976).
4Exceptions include analysis of deposit/refund systems by Bohm (1979) and Porter (1978, 1983). Studies
comparing policies are rarer. Menell (1990) conducts a theoretical exploration of polices for disposal of
nontoxic household waste. His study considers disposal fees to be enforceable and does not focus on differences
between recycling policies. The Congressional Budget Office (1991) discusses informally the issues that arise
in comparing these policies.
as did Connecticut in 1990, Washington and Idaho in 1991, and Michigan will begin a $6
deposit/refund in 1993. At the same time, the Environmental Protection Agency has consid-
ered a tax on virgin lead (Environment Reporter, 1991), and legislation for a national recycled
content standard has been introduced into Congress.5 Direct subsidies for proper disposal
are often suggested for hazardous materials in general; for lead-acid battery recycling, none is
currently under debate, although a number of states have indirect subsidies through tax privi-
leges for secondary lead producers (OTA, 1989). My analysis of these approaches to recycling
policy suggests that they are not interchangeable; the policies can be ranked on efficiency
grounds.
A view commonly expressed in the environmental economics literature is that recycling
policies like these, which are based upon altering prices, may have only limited success. Studies
of waste paper recycling, which compose the majority of empirical work on recycling programs,
have suggested that raising secondary materials prices will not change recycling behavior.6
My results suggest the opposite conclusion for lead recycling: the recovery of lead from auto
batteries is sensitive to prices. Thus, my empirical analysis suggests that price-based policy
mechanisms can be successful in encouraging recycling of auto batteries.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides background on the indus-
try and on the problem posed by automobile battery disposal. Lead-acid automobile batteries
are an important component of the hazardous waste generated by households, because lead
is highly toxic and a large volume of it is disposed in batteries. Batteries are both the largest
use of lead and, through recycling, one of the most important sources of lead supply.
The second section compares virgin-materials taxes, deposit/refunds, recycled content
standards, and subsidies. The tax and deposit/refund are equivalent in the incentives they
create, but the recycling subsidy and recycled content standard each have different effects.
The tax-deposit approach achieves a given reduction in the environmental costs from waste
sAs HR 5359 in 1990.
6 For example, Edwards and Pearce (1978) study waste paper recovery in the United States between 1947
and 1973. On the basis of their elasticity estimates they conclude that "if recycling is to be encouraged for
whatever reason, the weapons must be other than direct manipulation of prices (p. 248)." A similar statement
may be found in Edgren and Moreland (1989).
disposal with lower private costs than the other programs. Recycling subsidies are the most
costly way of achieving the same target, whereas recycled content standards, which act as a
hybrid of the tax and subsidy, have intermediate costs.
The third section calibrates this analysis for policies to encourage auto battery recycling.
Primary and secondary lead supply and demand elasticities are estimated for this purpose.
The results suggest that lead recovery has been moderately responsive to prices in the post-war
period.
In the fourth section, these estimates are used to simulate public policies for reduction in
lead disposal. The results suggest that significant reductions can be achieved with moderate
levels of government intervention. In addition, the disparities in the costs imposed by dif-
ferent policies may be substantial in magnitude. Finally, a brief conclusion considers other
environmental issues to which this analysis is pertinent and suggests directions for future
work.
1 The lead industry
To provide background for the discussion of recycling policies, this section describes some
of the salient features of the lead industry, including historical trends that will be useful in
interpreting the regression results in the third section. It also explains in more detail the
nature of the environmental damage caused by disposal of lead-acid batteries.
1.1 Uses of lead
Table 1 illustrates recent trends in several important uses of lead. Policy initiatives have
reduced lead use in many products in response to medical evidence of lead toxicity at low
exposure levels. The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Act of 1971 forbade use of leaded paint on
surfaces accessible to children; the use of lead in indoor paint was banned entirely beginning
in 1977. The EPA began a phase-out of lead additives in gasoline (tetraethyl and tetramethyl
lead) in 1975. Recent efforts have focused on reducing the use of lead solder in plumbing.
Table 1: Some principal uses of lead in the U.S., 1960-88 (metric tons)
Ammunition
Cable covering
Solder
Storage batteries
Pigments (total)
Paints
Gasoline additives
Total (all uses)
Percent used for batteries
1960 1970 1980 1985 1988
39,532 65,976 48,662 50,233 52,708
54,749 46,059 13,408 12,270 16,170
54,443 63,237 41,366 24,441 19,064
320,414 538,371 645,357 840,940 955.623
89,387 89,571 78,430 74,852 62,524
- - 45,361 44,146
148,621 252,656 127,903 45,694
926,392 1,234,272 1,057,967 1,133,737 1,230,732
34.6% 43.6% 61.0% 74.2% 77.6%
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines
However, not all the changes in lead use resulted from health regulations. Technological
changes also explain some of the pattern of lead use in Table 1. For example, lead for cable
covering has been replaced by plastic for some uses.
Despite these reductions, many products continue to use lead. Lead's primary use is
for lead-acid storage batteries: 956,000 metric tons were used in 1988, representing 78% of
the total consumption of lead in the U.S. for that year. Most lead-acid batteries are used
as starting-lighting-ignition batteries for motor vehicles (84% in 1988). About 5% of the
remaining lead is used for motive power in electric vehicles, like in-plant fork-lifts. Other
industrial uses, such as uninterruptable power supply for large computer systems and standby
power supply for emergency lighting, compose the remainder. Storage batteries made from
alternative materials will probably remain much more expensive than lead-acid batteries, while
use of batteries in electric vehicles and computer systems may rise substantially (Woodwell,
1985). Thus, the volume of lead in storage batteries should continue to grow and its disposal
raise problems in the future.
1.2 Supply of lead
Primary supply Primary (or virgin) metal accounted for an average of 49% of U.S. supplies
in the 1980s. Since the early 1970s, a single geologic formation, the Vibernum Trend in
southeastern Missouri, has supplied about 90% of the U.S. mine production. Most production
is from exclusively lead ores, but lead is also mined as co-product with zinc or silver. Firm
concentration in the primary industry has become high since the 1970s. 7
Secondary supply The secondary lead market accounts for the remaining half of refined
lead. Used batteries constitute the bulk of the recovered scrap (80% in 1988). Retail battery
dealers collect used batteries from consumers and typically discount purchases of new batteries
in exchange. Discounts have varied considerably: in general, they have been in the range of
$4 to $5; but in the early 1980s, some dealers charged a fee of $.50 for the disposal of batteries
(Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, 1987). Scrap battery dealers purchase used batteries and
sell them to battery "breakers," who remove the plastic cases and drain battery acid before
transfering them to secondary smelters who re-refine the lead. Secondary lead from battery
scrap is often used to make batteries (some battery manufacturers operate secondary smelters)
and is a very close substitute for primary lead in some other uses.
This recycling chain usually captures a large fraction of the used storage batteries. "Re-
covery rates" - the percentage of available scrap that is recycled - cannot be measured
directly, because the number of defunct batteries is unknown, but Figure 1 shows estimates of
these rates. The rates experienced a high of 86% in early 1960s, but they have since generally
declined. The lowest rates were observed in the early 1980s, falling to less than 50%, but rates
rebounded to near 70% later in the 1980s.8
7The Census of Manufactures withholds the concentration ratios for primary lead; as an indication, however,
four firms held 86% of the U.S. refining capacity in 1988. High concentration in primary production may affect
secondary production, as analysis of the Alcoa case has suggested (e.g. Swan, 1980). However, the "Alcoa
problem" is unlikely to be a factor in the lead industry. Both primary and secondary producers contribute to
the next period's supply of scrap lead, because lead may be re-recovered multiple times. Thus, the relevant
market for determining this intertemporal market power is both primary and secondary production, of which
primary lead composed only 48% in 1988.
SSome experts claim that the rates have never dropped this low, barely dipping below 90%. However, a
1983 survey of generators of small quantities of hazardous waste suggests that such figures are too high (Abt
Figure 1: Recovery rate of lead from auto batteries, 1954-88
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The cause of the dramatic decline in recovery rates in recent years is not clear. The price of
lead was low at this time (Figure 2) and a number of much stricter environmental regulations
for lead were introduced, perhaps contributing to the low price. Many of these regulations
affected primary producers at least as strongly as secondary producers and thus would not
explain the decline in the fraction of recycled to total lead produced.9 One regulation that
might have affected recycling particularly strongly was the reclassification of used batteries
as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This clas-
sification imposes large costs on facilities which must store batteries before reclaiming them
(dealers and transporters are exempt from these regulations). RCRA requires firms to ac-
quire permits and liability insurance for hazardous waste sites, which may be costly. Another
factor that may have contributed to the decline in recovery rates may be the growth in sales
of replacement batteries through do-it-yourself auto parts outlets. These batteries are more
likely to be disposed by households than batteries replaced by battery dealers who often sell
defunct batteries to scrap dealers.
1.3 Lead-acid batteries in municipal solid waste
Despite generally high recycling rates, auto batteries represent the majority of lead in munic-
ipal solid waste (see Table 2). In 1985, about 220,000 tons of battery lead were disposed in
municipal waste, accounting for 77% of the lead disposed there (Franklin Associates, 1989).
This lead may pose a serious threat to public health as well as to environmental quality.
Medical evidence points to toxic effects from lead at low levels of exposure. Studies have
gradually lowered the level of blood lead at which health harms are believed to arise; toxic
Associates, 1985) The generators of used batteries (primarily vehicle maintenance establishments) sent 89%
of batteries they collected to off-site recyclers, with the remainder mostly sent to solid waste landfills. This
represents an upper bound on recycling rates because some household change and dispose their own batteries.
In addition, firms wary of betraying illegal disposal of batteries may overreport the number they recycle.
9The new standards include: National Ambient Air Quality Standards for lead, fully implemented in
1988; OSHA standards for employee blood lead levels, effective 1983; OSHA standards for air exposure levels,
effective in 1986 for secondary smelters and in 1991 for primary smelters-refiners; and effluent limits under
the Clean Water Act in 1984 for smelters and battery producers. Engineering estimates suggest that all
environmental regulations in effect in 1988 added 6.8 cents/lb (18% of its price) to the cost of secondary lead
(OTA, 1989).
Table 2: Sources of lead in municipal waste, 1985
Short tons Percent
Lead-acid storage batteries 221.954 77.3%
Consumer electronics 47.011 16.4%
Glass and ceramic products 6,911 2.4%
Plastics 3,466 1.2%
Cans and other shipping containers 3,007 1.0%
Pigments 2,368 0.1%
Other 2,411 0.1%
Total 287,138 100%
Source: Franklin Associates, Characterization of Products Containing Lead and Cadmium in
Municipal Solid Waste in the United States, 1970 - 2000, 1989
effects are recognized at blood lead levels that now characterize 17% of urban children under
six (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 1988). With low levels of exposure,
children and fetuses are at risk of IQ deficits, impaired reaction time, and other neurological
problems; epidemiological studies find higher school drop-out rates and lower achievement
long after initial exposure.
When disposed in a landfill, automobile batteries can expose the population to lead.' 0
In the landfill, battery cases eventually break, releasing liquids tainted with lead that can
contaminate groundwater. The extent of the danger is not well documented. Of the 158
municipal landfills on the Superfund National Priority List, 22% have released lead, suggesting
that the potential exists for groundwater contamination at these sites and other municipal
landfills (ATSDR, 1988).
In addition to health risks, households that dispose batteries as ordinary trash impose
financial costs on other households. In recent years, landfill siting and design have been
modified in an attempt to diminish environmental harms from landfill leachate. Reducing the
toxicity of the leachate might relax constraints on landfill design and location and thus lower
'
0An additional concern arises in areas where municipal solid waste is incinerated, because lead from batteries
can escape in the air emissions from incineration. While state-of-the-art incineration technologies provide
sorting too thorough for auto batteries to be incinerated, some existing incinerators have little or no sorting.
Thus, some batteries may be incinerated (Franklin Associates, 1989) and give rise to substantial environmental
costs.
the average costs of trash disposal.
2 Analysis of recycling policies
In response to these risks from lead in solid waste, public policies to reduce battery disposal
have been proposed and implemented. Two general approaches can be taken. The first ap-
proach addresses the externality directly, by imposing requirements on battery disposal. In
practice, state legislatures have chosen an extreme quantity restriction, banning disposal of
batteries in municipal landfills."1 In principle, the government could also charge fees for bat-
tery disposal reflecting its environmental costs. Unlike the more common quantity mechanism,
this price-based policy would allow some battery disposal to continue if this outcome is so-
cially efficient. The difficulty with such programs is the near impossibility of enforcing them.
Consumers may dump batteries surreptiously rather than bear the costs of proper disposal. 12
The second policy is to strengthen the incentives for auto battery recycling. Such poli-
cies can take several different forms, including virgin-materials taxes on primary lead, de-
posit/refunds on auto batteries, recycled content standards for batteries and subsidies to the
secondary lead industry. This section analyzes these four policies. It begins with a framework
for a market with recycling, then examines the simple analytics of the recycling programs.
and finally compares their costs.
2.1 Framework for a market with recycling
Recycling policies can be compared in a partial-equilibrium framework in which there is a
demand for lead in auto batteries and two sources of supply, virgin and recycled. Consumers
purchase lead from both sources at a single price q, because virgin and recycled lead are nearly
1127 states had such laws in 1991. A national land disposal ban on vehicle batteries has been considered by
Congress.
12There is no systematic evidence about whether households do obey disposal restrictions and the anecdotal
evidence is mixed. Seattle has experienced virtually no increase in illegal disposal as a result of requiring
payment of fees for garbage collection (Stavins, 1991), but the New York Times (1988) reports that after the
imposition of fees, illegal disposal has been a problem in New Jersey.
perfect substitutes for many uses. The producer prices of virgin and recycled lead, denoted p,-
and p, respectively, may differ. Batteries are assumed to be the only use of lead for simplicity;
an appendix shows the analytical results for the more general case where there are other uses
of lead.
In the presence of recycling, demand depends not only on the consumer price of lead, but
also on the expected price of scrap battery lead, ps, when the battery wears out. For batteries
that are recycled, the effective price of battery lead is q - 6Ps (where 6 is a discount factor),
but for batteries that are disposed, the price of lead is q. Then, the total demand (TD) for
battery lead can be written as
TD(q, ps) = t(ps)D(q - bps) + (1 - ý(ps))D(q). (1)
where t(ps) is the fraction of batteries that are recycled and ps is the expected price of scrap
when returned.
An interpretation of this demand structure is that households vary in the time and effort
required to recycle their batteries. Households choose to recycle if the effort cost of returning
a battery is less than the scrap value of the battery. Then, the i(ps) in equation (1) reflects
the cumulative distribution of recycling costs in the population that purchases batteries.' 3
Alternatively, costs of returning batteries may vary geographically across battery dealers,
resulting in a similar demand pattern. 14
For the market to clear, this demand must equal the supply of virgin and recycled lead,
TD(q, ps) = V(pv) + R(pR). (2)
'
3 Suppose each household has an average cost of recovery per unit of lead, ei which is constant for the
household, but varies across households. Household i recycles if ei < Ps. Further, suppose that the lead
content per battery is price sensitive, but the number of batteries demanded is not because batteries are
essential to operating a car, but only a trivial fraction of its cost. If F(ei) is the cumulative distribution of
effort costs in households that purchase batteries, ý(ps) = F(ei _ psD(q - Ps)).
14In the early 1980s, there may have been few batteries recovered in the Pacific Northwest, after the closure
of the only lead recycling plant in the region (Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, 1987). Further, transporting
batteries may constitute a large fraction of their recovery cost, resulting in low collection rates in rural areas
(Schwartz and Pratt, 1990).
The two used lead prices, the price of scrap battery lead, ps and recycled lead, pR, should be
closely related. Suppose they differ only by a constant marginal re-refining cost: pR = Ps + a.
The demand equation (1) can then be written in terms of p,, with the recovery rate i(ps)
redefined as a r(pR). In a steady-state. the demand by households which recycle is equal to
the supply of recycled lead: is
r(pR)D(q - S(pR - a)) = R(pR)
Thus, the market-clearing condition (2) reduces to
(1 - r(pR))D(q) = V(pv). (3)
This equation, representing the residual demand for virgin lead and its supply, is the basis for
the analysis of price changes with policy interventions that follows.
2.2 The simple analytics of recycling policies
Virgin-materials tax An ad valorem virgin-materials tax of t, raises the price of lead to
its users, q = pv(1 + t). Because primary and secondary lead are perfect substitutes in some
uses, users will purchase recycled lead at the same price, q = p,. This implies PR = pv(1 + t).
The market-clearing condition with the tax is
(1 - r(pvT))D(pvT) = V(pv) (4)
where T = 1 + t.
To find an approximate expression for the price change associated with a given tax, taking
'
5 This identity requires that no lead is lost in reprocessing. In fact. reprocessing losses amount to only 3-5%
of re-refined lead, so this equation holds approximately.
derivatives yields
dD dr dV1 - r(pvT))(Tdpv + pdT) + D(pvT)(Tdpv + pvdT) = dpv.dq dpR dpv
Substituting a negative demand elasticity, ED, and positive primary and secondary supply
elasticities, ev and E, respectively, the expression for the change in pv is:16
dpv (ERI-- - ED) dT (5)
Pv ED - ER -. T
The producer price of virgin lead, pv, decreases, but the price of recycled lead, p,, and the
price to purchasers, q, increase.
The tax imposes costs on consumers and producers that exceed the revenue it collects.
These losses constitute private costs that weigh against the social benefits provided by a
reduction in lead disposal. Households who do not recycle and primary lead producers bear
burdens from the tax, but households who recycle bear no costs, if they do not discount the
scrap price of batteries (5 = 1)."' When the tax revenue generated is subtracted from the
households' costs the marginal private cost is
dPCt'a = -pvtdV, (6)
(yielding positive costs because dV is negative).
Deposit/refund A deposit/refund is analytically identical to a virgin-materials tax in this
framework. With a virgin-materials tax, all consumers pay a higher price for lead, but those
who recycle batteries recover the tax increment in the form of higher prices for their used
batteries. Similarly, a deposit/refund is returned to those who recycle, so it taxes only lead
e'This expression is related to the familiar partial-equilibrium incidence of a tax dp = •-•.fdT. Demand
in the usual expression is re-defined as residual demand for virgin lead - the left-hand side of equation (4)
- which has an elasticity of e, - 1e'-
"In this framework, the secondary industry receives revenue just equal to its constant marginal reprocessing
cost a and has no surplus to gain or lose.
use in batteries that are not recycled.' 8
Let level of the deposit/refund equal f, which is normalized by pv for algebraic simplicity.
The deposit raises the price of battery lead to users, so q = pv + pvf. However, the effective
price of scrap to households that recycle remains the same: q - Ps = a. These two equations
imply PR = pv(1 + f). The market clears when
[1 - r(pv(l + f))]D(pv(1 + f)) = V(pv), (7)
which is identical to equation (4), the market-clearing condition for the virgin-materials tax.
The implied private costs are also the same.
Subsidy to recycled lead A recycling subsidy could take the form of a refund to con-
sumers that is not funded by a deposit or a credit to firms per pound of lead they recover.
More indirect subsidies may also be used; for example, many states provide investment tax
credits to firms that produce recycled goods (OTA, 1989). Such subsidies may be effective in
reducing the marginal cost of recycled lead, but alter secondary firm behavior in other ways.
This analysis concentrates on the simplest form, which creates the incentives desired without
additional distortions.
Let the subsidy equal a (A = 1 + a) which is normalized by pv. Recycled lead now receives
an implicit subsidy: the price to users is q = p, - apv. But q = pv continues to hold, so
pi = pV(1 + a). The market now clears when
1 - r(pvA)]D(pv) = V(pv). (8)
Taking derivatives yields an equation comparable to equation (5):
dpv ERI -, dA
Pv ED - ER-, - E• A
isThe equivalence between these two programs will not hold, however, if there are other uses of lead in
addition to batteries. In this case, the deposit/refund will dominate the virgin-materials tax as a means of
reducing disposal of lead in batteries. This difference is illustrated in table 10 in section 4.
Not only does pv decline, but q = pv so the user price of refined lead declines with it. Thus,
the price of lead to its users declines with a refund, in contrast to a virgin-materials tax or
deposit/refund.
As a result, the subsidy also differs from the tax and deposit/approach in terms of who
bears its costs. Unlike the tax and deposit in which households that do not recycle lose,
these households gain from a subsidy because the cost of lead to them declines. Recycling
households also gain because their scrap is more valuable. On the other hand, the subsidy
imposes burdens on virgin material producers and dissipates government revenue. The net
marginal private cost is analogous to equation (6):
dPC"sub = apvdR.
To compare a subsidy to the cost of the tax-deposit approach, the marginal private cost per
unit reduction in virgin lead is more useful:
11 r
dPCu"bs = -apV -[ -(ER - ED)(ED - EV) + ED' ]dV. (10)
Ev CR - r
Recycled content standard A recycled content standard stipulates a ratio r* of recycled
lead to total lead in batteries. This ratio can be set as a standard that individual firms must
meet. Alternatively, trading between firms can be allowed; a firm using a larger fraction of
recycled material than the standard can trade its surplus with firms using too little, so the
standard applies to the industry as a whole. The permit system accomplishes a given r* for
minimum cost, if the permit market is competitive (Dinan, 1990). A marketable permit system
is analyzed here because this requires less information about the substitution opportunities
for different battery producers than a firm-by-firm standard.
Suppose that a permit entitles its holder to use one unit of virgin lead. This permit must
be traded for enough units of of recycled lead that the aggregate r* for the industry continues
to conform to the standard. This tradeoff holds if a permit can be created by the use of an
additional ._ units recycled lead. 19 Policy-makers choose the level of r* and it generates
an equilibrium permit price -r (where 7r is normalized by the price of primary lead).
With this system, users of lead perceive the price of virgin lead to be equal to its price plus
the price of the permit sacrificed to use it, q = pv +n'rp. On the other hand, recycled lead costs
p,R but creates ( .')-1 permits with value 7rpv, so its net cost is only q = PR - ( -_l)rpv.
The price of recycled lead in terms of pv is:
1 1
PR = pv(1 + T +( - 1)r) = pV(l + -
r* r*
Thus, the recycled content standard can be thought of as a revenue-neutral combination of a
virgin-materials tax and a subsidy to recycled lead.20
Now, the lead market will clear when
[1 - r(pv(l + ~7))]D(pv(1 + 7r)) = V(pv), (11)
and the permit market will clear when
r* = r(p(l + )).
r*
The change in lead price can be found for a dr* and the associated dir:
dpv, 1. [( R1 - )d7 - I dr (12)
pv ED - •E_ -E 1+ 1+ x 1+ r
19This tradeoff is the number of units z of recycled lead necessary to maintain r*:
R R+ x
R+V V+1+R+R z
20Anderson et al (1989) suggest a policy they refer to as "recycling credits" for waste oil, in which a subsidy
to recyclers is funded by a tax on the primary industry. If this policy is to be revenue-neutral, the ratio of
the subsidy to tax must be ' at the final recovery rate. Thus, this "recycling credits" program is equivalent
to the recycled content standard with permit trading; all the results for a recycled content standard apply to
either program.
The expression is simpler if there is assumed to be no standard in place at the outset, so the
initial 7r = 0 and r* = r:21
dpv _ _ - •o
v dr. (13)
Pv ED - ER 1-r_ - EV
The producer price of virgin lead declines as with all the programs, but the effect on q, the
price of lead to users, is ambiguous.2 2 It is unclear whether a recycled content standard
discourages lead use, like the tax and deposit, or encourages it like a subsidy.
The private costs of a recycled content standard are:
dPC cS = 7rpv( r dR - dV).
r
This expression is clearer if it is translated into a a revenue-neutral combination of tax and
subsidy
dPCRCS = -tpvdV + apvdR,
where the tax rate t = r and the effective subsidy is a = (k - 1)7r. Again, the expression can
be rewritten in terms of the change in virgin lead use:
dpCRCS e(e,(1 - r) - Ec) + ED(1 - r)(ED -R - ev) )dV (14)dPCCS rp(v(l 
- E)dV. (14)
1-r
21Equation (13) is phrased in terms of a change in the equilibrium price of permits because this makes
the analogy with tax and subsidy clearest, but in fact policy operates through a choice of dr* which in turn
determines dir and dpv. The change in price in terms of dr* is:
dpv _ C dr..
Pv e(1 - r*) - Ev
22The change in price to users is:
dq ER -EV dr
q E - j _ - ev
which is positive iff e. < Cv.
2.3 Comparison of the policies
Table 3 summarizes the results of the foregoing analyses of the recycling policies. The four
policies can be compared when they are implemented to achieve the same reduction in lead
disposal. This section first compares the level of the policy intervention (that is, how large
the tax or subsidy must be) and then uses this information to compare the private costs of
the various policies.
For this comparison, the reduction in lead disposal must be expressed in terms of the
variables used in this analysis. The amount of lead disposed is the difference between the
stock of scrap and the amount recovered. If demand and supply of lead do not shift over
time, then once the policy intervention has been in place for some time the available scrap
will equal the amount demanded in the current period. In this steady state, disposal is
(V(pv)+ R(pR)) - R(pR) = V(pv), so policies can target the amount of virgin lead produced.2 3
Although the popular view is that the goal of these recycling policies is to raise recovery rates,
the amount of virgin lead is a better target, because environmental costs may be reduced
not only by recycling ("pollution abatement") but also by "pollution prevention" through
discouraging consumption of the pollution-generating good.
Intervention levels Thus, policies should be compared at level necessary to achieve given
dV, which requires equal dpv under all policies. For a virgin-materials tax (or deposit/refund)
versus a recycling subsidy, equating (5) and (9) yields
da D(1 - r)( = 1r) > 1 (15)
dt cRr
23More generally, disposal equals Vt-4 + Rt- 4 - Rt, so Vt is at best an approximate target when the market
is not in steady state. In practice, the market for battery lead may not be static for several reasons, the
most significant being growth in demand for automobiles, electric vehicles, and back-up power for computers.
Further, the introduction of a recycling policy itself will induce dynamics in the market. With a tax or deposit,
more battery scrap is available at the outset of the program than a few years later, because these programs
reduce demand for lead. It makes less sense to phrase the problem as achieving a disposal reduction target
when the market is not in steady-state; the level of disposal as well as the level of the tax or subsidy should
be allowed to vary with time.
Table 3: Summary of results for recycling policies
Virgin materials tax Recycling subsidy Recycled content
and deposit/refund standard
Decrease in virgin (ER 'E - ED)Y-t ER (ER~ - ED,)ydr
lead price (- )
Change in > 0 < 0 > or < 0
consumer price (dq)
Marginal -tpvdV apvdR irpv( -- dR - dV)
private cost
Note: The derivation of these expressions is described in the text. The symbols are:
Policy interventions - t is the level of the virgin materials tax, a is the subsidy level, and 7r
is the price of permit to use one unit of recycled lead under a recycled content
standard with trading.
Quantities - V is the amount of virgin lead, and R the amount recycled lead. The
R
recovery rate is r = •.
Elasticities - the supply elasticity of recovered battery lead is ER, and for virgin lead, ev,
and the demand elasticity for lead in batteries is Ev.
1
The expression for !PY for the recycled content standard assumes no initial intervention in
pv
the market; the more general case is shown as equation (13) in the text.
when there is no intervention initially. Expression (15) implies a higher subsidy a than tax
t for the same level of disposal. This result has a simple explanation: a subsidy to recycled
lead does not discourage lead use like a virgin-materials tax or deposit/refund, so a stronger
intervention is necessary to accomplish the same reduction in disposal.
On the other hand, the price of a permit is less than the level of the tax for changes in the
neighborhood of the no-intervention equilibrium. Comparing the price of permits with the
tax yields
de ER _ - ~Ddr 1R < 1. (16)
dt •ER1-_• 
- ED
The price of the permit does not capture the complete effect of the program: 7r is the rate
of the effective tax on virgin lead use, but there is also an effective subsidy to recycled lead.
Because of this additional subsidy, a smaller 7r than t is necessary to achieve a small reduction
in V.
Private costs Comparing the private costs of the four policies at the same dV provides
an assessment of their cost-effectiveness in reducing environmental damages.24 Using the
expressions for private cost in terms of dV in equations (6), (10), and (14), the policies can
be ranked for a given dV:
dPC"u" > dPCRcs > dPClto .
That is, the tax-deposit provides the least costly means of reducing lead disposal, and a
subsidy to recycled goods the most costly. A recycled content standard with trading of
permits is intermediate in costs.
The virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund are not just the most cost-effective of these
four policies but the best of all possible policies. Two arguments support this claim. First,
it is argued above that accomplishing a reduction in disposal is equivalent to accomplishing a
"4In the presence of multiple environmental externalities, it is not necessarily true that more recycling
will decrease the total external costs (Baumol, 1977). In this analysis, I assume disposal cost are the only
environmental costs that have not been internalized so the policies can be compared in terms of their private
costs alone. However, Stavins (1991) expresses doubts about whether battery recycling does result in a net
reduction in environmental damages.
reduction in virgin lead use. But, the least costly means of reducing virgin lead use is to tax
the good itself - not subsidize its substitutes as the subsidy and recycled content standard
do. Second, with a deposit/refund and virgin-materials tax, only lead that is disposed (and
thus generates externalities) is taxed. Although they are not waste-end taxes, these policies
effectively tax disposal and thus act as Pigouvian taxes. 25
Although the policies considered here differ from the usual instruments of environmen-
tal policy, the results are consistent with the literature on environmental policy design (e.g.
Baumol and Oates, 1988; Bohm and Russell, 1985). One apparent inconsistency is the ineffi-
ciency of the tradeable permit system. The result arises because of the specific permit system
analyzed, namely one based on recycled content standards. It would be possible to design a
tradeable permit system that would be no more costly than the virgin-materials tax. In the
steady-state, such a system would simply require a permit per unit of primary lead used, with
the number of permits set by the government in order to achieve a given reduction in disposal,
rather than allowing permits to be created by use of recycled lead.
By contrast, the subsidy considered here is the most efficient form of subsidy. A recycling
subsidy provides the correct incentives for pollution abatement, when the pollution in question
is waste disposal. The problem arises with the use of subsidies in general, rather than the
particular design of the subsidy considered here. In the presence of recycling, subsidizing
pollution abatement also encourages consumption of the offending good. Subsidies are not a
preferred policy for regulating disposal when recycling is an option.2 6
3 Empirical analysis of the market for lead
To estimate the empirical effects of these policies and the magnitude of their costs requires
information about the lead supply and demand elasticities (ER, ev, and e,). Following a discus-
25Menell (1990) makes this argument for the deposit/refund.20Studies of environmental policy design have argued that taxes should be preferred to subsidies, although
the marginal incentives are the same, because the subsidy may adversely affect firms' entry and exit deci-
sions (see Baumol and Oates, 1988, ch. 8). In this analysis, taxes are preferred to subsidies even if the number
of firms in the industry not responsive to the programs. Taxes dominate subsidies more generally because of
the effect of subsidies on supply of the good.
sion of previous empirical work, this section presents estimates of the relevant elasticities. In
the following section, these estimates are applied to the incidence and private cost expressions
above to simulate the consequences of the three policies.
Previous empirical work on supply and demand relationships for recyclable materials falls
into two general categories. First, a number of authors construct econometric models of
various world metals markets to project the effects of supply disruptions. Wise (1979) builds
this kind of model for the lead industry. However, he focuses on projecting lead supply and
price and does not make an effort to estimate structural relationships. Thus, many of his
regression do not include price variables or do not correspond to meaningful supply functions.
A study of world copper markets by Fisher, Cootner and Bailey (1972) provides elasticities
from another non-ferrous metal market for comparison.
Second, a few empirical studies concentrate on recycling activity per se. The largest group
of studies examines paper markets (for example, Deadman and Turner, 1981; Edgren and
Moreland, 1989; Edwards and Pearce, 1978; Lahiri and Kinkley, 1984). All of these studies
ignore the substantial change in the composition of waste paper during the time studied which
leads to error in their price variables. Some of these studies also fail to take into account the
endogeneity of paper prices. Perhaps as a result of these econometric problems, most of these
studies do not find significant price effects on recovery. The authors are skeptical about the
potential of price-based policies to alter paper recycling behavior, and this skepticism has
occasionally cast doubt on recycling programs in general.
A small number of other studies examine public policies for metal recycling. Anderson
and Speigelman (1976) estimate supply and demand equations for lead in order to study the
impact of the tax code on secondary material use. The equations they estimate are the most
similar to those estimated here, but they use short time series (1949 to 1967 or 1972) that
precedes the opening of the major Missouri mines and the recent declines in recycling rate.27
Further, their demand elasticities fail to take into account the effect of scrap prices on lead
27In addition, the wartime price controls on lead were not lifted until 1951, making their use of observations
prior to 1952 suspect. Further, they use zinc price as an instrument for the price of lead, but zinc is frequently
produced as a co-product with lead, so its price is unlikely to be exogenous.
consumption. Studies of other markets with recycling include related work by Anderson and
Speigelman (1977) on steel, Slade (1980) on copper, and estimates of metal recovery from
municipal waste by Bingham, et al (1983) (aluminum and ferrous metals, based on simulated
data from engineering models). In addition, the extensive literature on Alcoa's aluminum
monopoly contains estimates of secondary aluminum supply elasticity in the early twentieth
century (e.g. Suslow, 1986); however, recycling behavior (of households at least) seems likely
to have changed substantially over this time.
3.1 Recovery of battery lead
This section describes my estimates of lead recovery elasticities. Supply of recycled lead
depends on the stock of available scrap and on the price of refined lead. The basic supply
equation is estimated in the form:
log rt = 31 + 32 log(pt) +...other terms... + Et. (17)
where rt is the recovery rate and pt is the price of refined lead.28 Secondary lead constitutes
about half of all lead production, so the price of lead in this equation is endogenous and
instruments are used for this price.
Variables The dependent variable for these regressions is the recovery rate - the amount
of lead recovered from motor vehicle batteries divided by the amount of scrap battery lead
(shown in Figure 1). The numerator of this variable is the total lead recovered from batteries,
from which an estimate of lead recovered from industrial and traction batteries has been
subtracted. The denominator is based on the sum of replacement batteries shipments and
28A maintained assumption in these regressions is that the number of defunct batteries, the denominator
of the regression is not itself sensitive to the price of lead. This assumption will be violated if households
replace batteries before the batteries cease to function and the extent of this precautionary behavior depends
on battery prices. There is no direct evidence about when households replace batteries. However, running the
instrumental variables regression in table 4 with the log of estimated scrap battery stock as the dependent
variable does not yield significant coefficients on price when the number of cars in use is included as a right-
hand-side variable. The coefficient and its standard error are .15 (.14) and .05 (.14) depending upon whether
a trend is included as well.
motor vehicle de-registration in that year, because every defunct battery must either have
been replaced or the car taken out of service. This value was multiplied by the estimated lead
content of these batteries: the fourth and fifth lags of the ratio of the amount of lead used for
auto batteries to total U.S. battery production in a given year.2 9
Instruments Instruments for the price of lead were chosen from policy variables that shift
demand for lead. First, the EPA phase-out of lead additives in gasoline beginning in 1975 had
a substantial impact on lead use (see Table 1). This program had two distinct regimes: from
1975 to late 1982, the standards for maximum lead content applied to all gasoline; but after
November, 1982, the standards applied to leaded gasoline only and EPA permitted trading
of rights to meet this standard. Two instruments represent the level of these standards, a
different variable for each regime. Second, demand reflected the level of military ordnance
purchases, because ammunition was a major use of lead. The number of active duty military
personnel is used as instrument to reflect exogenous changes in the government's demand for
ammunition. In addition to these policy variables, the equations also include lagged price and
recovery rate variables.
Results Table 4 shows the estimation results. The first five equations use the price of refined
lead, because this price variable is appropriate for the analysis in Section 2. All the equations
are estimated with an AR(1) error structure because this structure could not be rejected in
preliminary regressions. The basic regression in column (1) yields an point estimate for the
recovery rate elasticity of .25 that is statistically significant. Based on this regression, a value
of .3 is used for this elasticity in the policy simulations because it lies in the middle of the range
of estimated values. For comparison, Anderson and Speigelman (1976) find supply elasticity
for all secondary lead of 0.48 for the period 1954-1972. In a different non-ferrous metals
market, copper, Fisher, Cootner, and Bailey, find a short-run supply elasticity of secondary
29The average lifetime of batteries varied from 35 to 40 months during this period, rising until the early
1970s and declining since then (Salkind et al, 1984). Lags of 4 and 5 are chosen, because in addition to its
useful life, a battery may sit on a shelf for over a year before it is sold (Consumer Reports. 1987) and for a
few months before it is reprocessed (Abt Associates, 1985).
copper of 0.42-0.44 and a long-run elasticity of 0.31-0.33.
The equations in columns (3) and (4) explore possible dynamics for the supply equation.
In both cases, negative coefficients on the lagged endogenous variables are observed. Such a
negative relationship might be expected if the effect of high price periods is to draw down
inventories of used batteries, but this effect does not appear to be strong in magnitude nor
are the coefficients statistically significant. The last column illustrates the results when the
price variable is the price of used batteries paid by dealers. 30 A lower elasticity estimate is
suggested by this equation.
3.2 Supply of refined virgin lead
This section estimates the elasticity of primary metal supply, the other supply elasticity neces-
sary for policy comparisons. Lead is mined in large underground chambers with thousand-foot
shafts. Capacity can only be expanded slowly, and maintenance requirements make it difficult
to shut down operations temporarily. For this reason, the supply of primary lead is modeled
using a partial-adjustment framework. The desired supply in a given year is a function of the
price of refined lead.
The dependent variable is the quantity of refined primary lead produced annually, a stage
of production comparable to the recovered lead variable used above. The price is the U.S.
producer price of refined lead as in the previous set of equations.
Instruments The instruments used for price in recycled lead supply could be used here,
because they reflect shifts in the demand for refined lead. However, two of the instruments -
the EPA's limits on lead in gasoline - are factors that were known in advance, whereas the
third instrument describes demand shifts that were not entirely predictable at the time. It
seems likely that the speed of adjustment to the two types of changes would differ. Suppose
30The series, gathered from daily price reports in American Metals Market, has a gap between 1963 and
1974. A projected price based on refined lead price is used for these years
Table 4: Instrumental variables estimates for secondary battery lead supply
Intercept
Log(Price of
refined lead)
Log(Price of
refined leadtl)
Log(Price of
used batteries)
Log(Recovery ratetl)
Trend
Autocorrelation
coefficient
Implied supply
elasticity
Dependent variable: Log(Recovery rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-. 59
(.68)
.25
(.12)
-.41
(.67)
.15
(.14)
-.75
(.20)
.52
(.13)
-.63
(.21)
.27
(.20)
-.41
(.07)
-. 17
(.13)
S- 
.077
(.054)
S- 
-.056
(.150)
4- -.0010
(.0013)
.43 .34 .45 .47 .41
(.15) (.16) (.16) (.15) (.16)
.25
(.12)
.15
(.14)
.44
(.71)
.26
(.73)
.08
(.05)
Years: 1954-88.
AR(1) error structure for all equations.
Instruments for price: limits on lead content of gasoline; number of active duty military
personnel; first lag of log(price) and log(recovery rate). Equations (3) and (4) also have first
lags of all pre-determined variables.
supply is modeled as:
St - St-1 = 01(S* - St-1) + 02(E, -(S*) - St-1) + E
where 81 reflects responsiveness to actual desired supply, and 02 reflects changes that are
planned a period in advance. Let desired supply be defined as
s; = zto
with innovations to Zt:
vt = Zt - Et_1(Zt).
Then,
St - St-_ = (81 + 02)(Zt/3 - St_) - 02vtO3 + E-
However, Vt is unobserved and will bias the estimates of the coefficient on Zt. The problem
can be avoided with instruments that are uncorrelated with vt, which by construction will
be true of variables used to forecast Zt. Therefore, only variables whose values are known in
advance are used; so the leaded gasoline phase-out instruments are included, but active duty
military personnel is dropped. In addition, from 1959 through 1966, a quota was imposed on
the imports of lead; a dummy for these years is included as an instrument.
Results Table 5 shows the results of these regressions, which appear to be sensitive to
the specification. Long-run elasticity estimates range from .37 to .8. The basic regression
in column (2) suggests a low supply elasticity but this increases when a trend is added in
column (3). The estimate of .8 from column (3) is used in the regressions. For comparison,
Anderson and Speigelman (1976) estimated a short-run supply elasticity of lead of .55 with
a long-run elasticity of of 1.0, for 1949-67. Wise (1979) found the supply elasticity of .92,
but this estimate excludes Missouri mines which have provided 90% of primary lead since the
1970s.
One concern in interpreting these equations is structural change in primary lead supply
as a result of the switch in the late 1960s and early 1970s from small dispersed mines to the
massive operations in the New Lead Belt. In column (4), this change is represented by a
dummy for the period following 1969 the year of the first significant production from the New
Lead Belt in Missouri, which has a significant positive effect on supply. A Chow test does
not reject (at 5%) the restriction that the coefficients on price and lagged supply were stable
across this period.
3.3 Demand for battery lead
As in section 2, the demand equation estimated here relies on an effective price of battery
lead that depends on whether the battery is expected to be recycled or not. Total demand
(in equation (1)) thus has two components:
TD(q, ps) = rD,(q - 8ps) + (1 - r)D 2(q). (18)
where 6 is a discount factor and Ps is the price of scrap battery lead. The
price for this equation is the expected price at the time when batteries
forecasts are assumed to equal current prices.
The equation estimated assumes that demand has a constant elasticity
demand behavior of recyclers and non-recyclers is the same, but the two
different prices. 31 That is, both Di(p) and D2(p) are assumed to have the
appropriate scrap
wear out. These
form and that the
groups experience
form:
log Dt = 1 + /3 2log pt + Zt" + et. (19)
where Zt is a matrix of other variables that may determine demand and et is a disturbance
term. 02 is the demand elasticity, E,, that needs to be estimated to calibrate the policy
31It is possible that the demand behavior of recyclers and others may differ systematically; for example,
those who do not recycle may be wealthier households with higher time costs and less elastic demand.
Table 5: Instrumental variables estimates for primary lead supply
Intercept
Log(Price of refined lead)
Log(Refined primary leadt_1)
Trend
Opening of Missouri mines
(Dummy beginning 1969)
Durbin-Watson
LM test for AR(1)
Significance level
Implied supply
elasticity
Dependent variable:
Log(Refined primary lead)
(1) (2) (3)
13.06
(.05)
.053
(.098)
2.87
(.95)
.083
(.070)
.78
(.07)
3.73
(1.31)
.25
(.15)
.70
(.11)
.0048
(.0039)
(4)
6.19
(2.17)
.38
(.10)
.37
(.19)
.26
(.09)
.46
- .78 .16 .68
(.37) (.69) (.40)
.053
(.98)
.38
(.28)
.84
(.34)
.60
(.32)
Years: 1952-1988.
Instruments: limits on lead content of gasoline; quota on lead imports.
Serial-correlation robust standard errors in parentheses.
comparisons in section 2. Combining equations (18) and (19) yields
log Dt = 1 -+ /32 log(rt(qt - 6pt)03 2 + (1 - rt)qt) + Z-y + et. (20)
The parameters of this equation are estimated using a nonlinear instrumental variables pro-
cedure.
The dependent variable employed in the first three equations is lead per auto battery
rather than total battery lead. This variable is chosen because households are unlikely to
alter measurably the number of batteries they purchase, but changes in the price of lead may
be reflected in the lead content of batteries. In the last two columns, this restriction is released
and total battery lead used as the dependent variable.
The composition of demand for lead has changed dramatically in over the time period
covered over the years since the 1950s, as first section indicated. The parameters of demand
for lead in batteries should be stable, however, despite these structural shifts. Instruments
for lead price were chosen from policy variables that affected demand for lead in other uses.
The same instrument set was used in the recovery rate equations in table 4: limits on the
lead content of gasoline, and the number of active duty military personnel, reflecting demand
for ammunition. In addition, the lagged price and lagged dependent variable are used as
instruments.
Results The estimates in table 6 suggest a low demand elasticity for the lead content of
batteries. In the first column, demand has a simple log-linear form that does not account for
the effect of the scrap price on the effective price of lead for households that recycle. Including
the price of whole used batteries in the next columns barely changes the results. The scrap
price is only a small fraction of the price of refined lead (in 1988, $.02/pound relative to
$.37/pound for refined lead, although early in the period the ratio is somewhat higher) so its
limited effect is not surprising. Column (3) includes a time trend to account for technological
changes; however, this equation does not produce a negative point estimate for the elasticity.
In the final two columns, the dependent variable is total lead used for batteries, rather than
Table 6: Demand for lead in motor vehicle batteries
Intercept (01)
Demand elasticity (/32)
Trend
Cars in use
Autocorrelation
coefficient
Dependent variable:
Lead content Total lead
per motor vehicle battery in batteries
6=0 6=1 6=1
(1) (2)
3.95
(.04)
-.14
(.09)
3.94
(.05)
-. 14
(.11)
(3)
3.97
(.05)
.082
(.157)
.0029
(.0013)
.53
(.20)
.58
(.20)
.51
(.18)
6=1 6=1
(4) (5)
4.87
(.21)
-. 12
(.06)
3.65
(.93)
-. 14
(.09)
-.067
(.031)
6.1 .35
(.7) (.13)
.54
(.17)
.22
(.17)
Years: 1954-1988
The basic equation is:
log Dt = 0, + log(rt(qt - 6p[) 02 + (1 - rt)qt•) + Zy + et,
which was estimated by nonlinear least squares, with an AR(1) error structure.
Instruments for price were: limits on lead content of gasoline; number of active duty military
personnel; first lag of price and of dependent variable.
the lead per battery. This specification allows for the possibility that households may adjust
the frequency with which they buy batteries in response to the lead price. The number of cars
in use is included as a critical determinant of total demand for battery lead. The equations
I suggest estimates for the demand elasticity similar to those from the earlier equations.
Previous studies have also found low demand elasticities for lead. Moroney and Tra-
pani (1981) provide estimates of the Allen elasticities of substitution for inputs into storage
battery manufacture, including lead. From their results, derived demand for lead appears to
be somewhat more elastic than these estimates, E, = -0.20. Anderson and Speigelman (1976)
estimate a demand elasticity for all lead (not just lead in batteries) of ED = -0.21 for 1949-72.
Further, inelastic demand for lead in storage batteries is consistent with the lack of attention
in battery engineering papers such as Salkind et al (1984) to the lead content of batteries,
although battery weight is an important concern.
4 Empirical effects of battery recycling policies
S The elasticities estimated in Tables 4, 5 and 6 can then be used compare the three alternate
recycling policies. Table 7 provides a summary of the features of the three policies. It uses
elasticities ER = 0.3, Ev = 0.8, and ED = -0.1, drawn from the estimated equations in section 3.
The equilibrium before policy intervention is characterized by 1988 price ($.3714 per pound
of refined lead) and recovery rate (p = 0.65).32
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results in table 7. First, the table indicates
that the tax and subsidy rates necessary to achieve moderate reductions in lead disposal are
consistent with those under consideration by policy-makers. For instance, the $5 per battery
deposit/refund recently adopted by several states should result about a 20% reduction in
battery lead disposal. On the other hand, a virgin-materials tax would have to be much
higher than the current Superfund feedstock tax on primary lead-oxides (only .2 cents per
32The model assumes a steady-state, so the recovery rate and the ratio of recycled to total lead are the
same. For the simulations, the actual recovery rate is taken to represent the ratio of recycled lead and is
applied to the 1988 total lead quantity to find V and R.
Table 7: Estimated effects of recycling policies
Virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund
Tax level (per pound of lead)
Deposit per battery
Revenue (million 1988 dollars)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycling subsidy
Subsidy level (per pound of lead)
Revenue cost (million 1988 dollars)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
Price of permits(per pound of lead)
Level of standard (r*)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Simulations are based on eR = .3, Ev = .8, and E, = -. 1 and 1988 prices and quantities.
necessary tax, subsidy, and permit prices for a given level of disposal reduction are
calculated from the price changes in equations (5), (9) and (13), respectively. The other
results follow from these rates or the private cost equations in section 2.
Decrease in lead disposal
10% 20% 50%
reduction reduction reduction
$0.10 $0.20 $0.51
$2.20 $4.40 $9.39
54 98 151
6.0 24 151
$0.12 $0.24 $0.60
150 320 990
12 49 309
$0.07 $0.14 $0.35
.69 .73 .84
6.6 27 166
The
pound) to accomplish substantial disposal reduction.
Second, table 7 illustrates the magnitudes of the policy differences in section 2. For a
reduction in disposal of 20%, a virgin-materials tax or deposit/refund would need to be $0.20
per pound of lead, whereas to achieve the same results, a direct subsidy would have to be
$0.24 per pound. The price of permits can be even lower - $.14 for a permit to use a pound
of primary lead - because they combine a tax and a subsidy. The variation in private costs
is broad; they range from $24 million for the tax-deposit approach to $49 million for recycling
subsidies. The recycled content standard does not appear to be much more costly than a
tax or deposit program; for a 20% reduction, it costs $27 million, only 8% more than the
tax-deposit approach.
Tables 8 and 9 contain sensitivity analyses for the results in table 7. Table 8 varies the
supply elasticities. Note that the costs of the programs decline with increases in the elasticities,
in contrast to the ordinary result for tax burdens. Higher elasticities make it possible to reduce
lead disposal by any amount with a more modest policy intervention and therefore impose
lower costs for this reduction. The percentage difference in cost between the programs also
declines with the elasticities, because the tax or subsidy rates decline and costs are related to
the square of these rates.
In table 9, varying the demand elasticity significantly affects only the subsidy program.
It becomes more expensive as the elasticity grows because the perverse incentives to increase
consumption of lead have more impact. The difference in costs between the tax-deposit
approach and a recycled content standard also rises slightly for the same reason.
The values in tables 7-9 represent an optimistic view of the outcome of the four policies.
Actual policies must be designed correctly to achieve costs as low as those in the tables. First,
a recycled content standard may be implemented without allowing trading of rights, like the
current legislation under consideration in Congress. For this proposal, the private costs in
table 7 represent a lower bound; true costs will probably be higher, reflecting differential
possibilities for firms to substitute recycled for virgin lead.
Second, proposals for deposit/refunds usually rely on a single deposit for all batteries,
Table 8: Recycling policies with different supply elasticities
ER = 0.15
Virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund
Tax level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycling subsidy
Subsidy level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
Permit price (dollars/pound)
Private cost (million 1988 dollars)
eR = 0.3
Virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund
Tax level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycling subsidy
Subsidy level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
Permit price (dollars/pound)
Private cost (million 1988 dollars)
ER = 0.45
Virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund
Tax level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycling subsidy
Subsidy level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
Permit price (dollars/pound)
Private cost (million 1988 dollars)
Primary lead elasticity
Ev = 0.4
.377
45.9
.509
155
.272
53.6
.296
35.2
.347
88.8
.20
40.3
.263
31.3
.293
70.2
.179
35.2
ev = 0.8
.285
33.9
.384
96.7
.205
38.8
Benchmark
case
.203
24.2
.238
49.4
.140
26.6
.170
20.3
.190
36.5
.116
21.9
Note: All results are for a 20% reduction in lead
the benchmark level displayed in Table 7.
disposal. The central panel (ER = .3, ER = .8) is
|Ev = 1.2
.250
30.2
.340
80.1
.183
34.1
.172
20.5
.202
38.6
.119
22.2
.139
16.6
.155
27.4
.095
17.7
Table 9: Recycling policies with different demand elasticities
Virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund
Tax level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycling subsidy
Subsidy level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
Standard (r*)
Permit price (dollars/pound)
Private cost (million 1988 dollars)
Lead demand elasticity
ED = 0
.222
26.5
.222
26.5
.726
.146
26.5
Benchmark
ED = -0.1
.203
24.2
.238
49.3
.728
.140
26.6
Note: Supply elasticities are those in table 7. as is the demand elasticity in the center column. All
results in the table are for a 20% reduction in lead disposal.
ED = -0.2
.189
22.5
.254
77.7
.731
.136
26.8
rather than one that varies with the lead content of the battery. This traditional approach
removes the deposit's incentive for substitution towards lower lead content in batteries. But
the refund continues to have a marginal effect on battery recovery. As a result, this type of
deposit/refund program will create similar marginal incentives to a recycling subsidy. The
two programs differ primarily in that the deposit/refund continues to discourage the purchase
of batteries, but auto battery demand is likely to be highly inelastic. The private costs of the
program will therefore be similar to those for the subsidy.
Third, the full menu of policies is not available to states that want to reduce battery
disposal on their own. A local virgin-materials tax or recycled content standard would be
unlikely to have a substantial impact on the national price of primary lead and any increased
recovery would not be concentrated in that state. The deposit/refund or direct subsidy offer
mechanisms for increasing recycling within the state directly and may be the only sensible
policies for states acting unilaterally.3 3
Finally, the analysis has assumed that all lead is used in batteries. Although batteries
comprise a large and rising percentage of lead demand, there are also many other uses of lead,
ranging from construction to medical uses, which make up 22% of total U.S. lead consumption.
These other uses can be made explicit with an additional demand curve in the market-clearing
equation,
Db(q, ps) + Do(q) = V(pv) + R(pR),
where the o subscript refers to other uses. In the presence of alternative uses for lead, a number
of features of the policy ranking change (results analogous to those in section 2 are outlined
in an appendix). Table 10 illustrates the results of adding another sector that uses lead. The
demand elasticities shown for this other sector should be compared to Wise's (1979) estimate
of -.33 for lead demand in uses other than batteries, ammunition, and gasoline additives in
33Another restriction on the results in table 7 is that they are based on the steady-state lead reductions for
each policy intervention. In the short term for policies that increase the consumer price of lead, disposal falls
by less than this amount because initially high lead stocks provide a large supply of cheap recycled lead. When
these short-term effects on lead supply are taken into account, the subsidy and recycled content standard will
look more favorable relative to taxes or deposits than they appear in these tables.
Table 10: The effect of a non-battery sector on recycling policies
Deposit/refund
Tax level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Virgin-materials tax
Tax level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycling subsidy
Subsidy level (dollars/pound)
Private costs (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
(for batteries only)
Standard (recovery rate)
Permit price (dollars/pound)
Private cost (million 1988 dollars)
Recycled content standard
(for all uses of lead)
Standard (recovery rate)
Permit price (dollars/pound)
Private cost (million 1988 dollars)
One sector
benchmark
.203
24.2
.202
24.2
.238
49.3
.728
.140
26.6
Two sector results
Demand elasticity in other sector:
Eo = 0 Eo = -. 3 o = -.6
.166 .159 .153
19.8 18.9 18.3
.166 .183 .199
19.8 28.1 37.4
.195 .187 .180
36.7 34.4 32.7
.737 .737 .736
.115 .110 .106
21.4 20.4 19.6
.597 .600 .603
.096 .099 .102
22.8 24.9 26.7
All results are for a 20% reduction in battery lead disposal.
The total recycled and disposed battery lead is the same for in all columns, but the amount
of lead used for other goods in 1988 is added in the last three columns. For the recycled
content standard on battery lead alone, it is assumed that all recycled lead is used in
batteries from the outset. These values are based on expression for price changes and private
cost shown in the appendix.
the United States. 34
The most important change is that a deposit/refund now dominates a virgin-materials
tax.35 The virgin-materials tax creates production inefficiencies because it taxes not only the
disposal of batteries (like the deposit/refund) but also the use of lead in the other sector. In
table 10, the virgin-materials tax results in private costs of $28 million for a 20% reduction
in battery lead disposal, while the deposit/refund accomplishes this reduction for only $19
million. In addition, a subsidy can be preferred to a virgin-materials tax, if amount of lead in
alternative uses and the elasticity of demand in these uses were large enough. In the table, the
tax dominates the subsidy for low elasticities in the other sector, but not for higher values.
Under this new regime, an ambiguity arises about the design of a recycled content standard.
If the standard applies only to batteries, with perfect substitution of secondary for primary
lead, there should just be a shift of any recycled lead used by other industries into battery
manufacture. Thus, if much recycled lead is used in the manufacture of goods other than
batteries, the standard should apply to all goods manufactured with lead to assure that it
does increase total demand for recycled lead. However, if almost all recycled lead is used in
batteries at the outset, a standard applied to batteries alone will be sufficient and preferable
because it results in a lower private cost. Both alternatives are presented in the table.
As before, these standards are equivalent to revenue-neutral combinations of a tax and
a subsidy. The standard for batteries alone is equivalent to a deposit/refund in which the
revenue raised is redistributed as a recycling subsidy, while the standard on all lead is like a
virgin-materials tax and recycling subsidy. Therefore, the standard on batteries is less costly
than a straight subsidy, but the standard on all lead, like the virgin-materials tax, may be
more or less costly than a subsidy. Table 10 suggests that even the most costly recycled
content standard remains better than the subsidy for the estimated parameters.
34An additional sector alters the costs of the policy even if demand in this sector exhibits zero elasticity, as
a result of the assumption of constant elasticities. When the amount of lead in the market increases, a larger
price change is necessary to achieve the same absolute reduction in lead disposal.
3SThe results in the table 10 and the text assume that the goal remains a reduction in battery lead disposal
only, not disposal of lead in alternative uses. This target could be appropriate if lead in these other uses is
disposed only in the very distant future, as for example lead used in construction, or if environmental damages
from disposal of lead in these uses is already regulated, for example through industrial hazardous waste policy.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers recycling policies that can reduce environmental costs from waste disposal
when more direct restrictions are too difficult to enforce. Successful recycling policies address
disposal at two levels, encouraging recovery of lead and discouraging its consumption. The
virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund are the best policies because they operate on both
margins. By contrast, a subsidy for recycling is the worst policy because it fails on the second
margin, decreasing the price of lead to users and thus encouraging lead consumption.
The policy analysis was applied to programs aimed at the recovery of lead from automobile
batteries, using supply and demand parameters estimated from the U.S. lead market. This
empirical analysis suggests two conclusions. First, price-based recycling policies can effectively
increase lead recycling, a conclusion that contrasts with earlier studies of recycling policy.
This difference from previous work results in part from the moderate price sensitivity of lead
recovery that is observed. In addition, these simulations explicitly consider the complete
market for lead, so the effects of the policies on virgin lead production and overall demand
are taken into account, in contrast to earlier studies. Second, this empirical analysis reveals
substantial differences between the policies in the costs of accomplishing the same disposal
reduction. A recycling subsidy may entail roughly twice the private costs of the most efficient
tax-deposit approach.
The policy rankings in this paper are relevant for a number of environmental policy is-
sues other than those raised by automobile batteries. Households dispose of several kinds of
hazardous wastes besides auto batteries; automobile engine oil and other household batteries
contribute substantially to the toxicity of municipal solid waste and are likely targets of state
and federal recycling programs in the next few years. Chlorofluorocarbons in household re-
frigrators and air conditioners would be good candidates for these policies because prohibitions
against releasing them into the air pose particularly thorny enforcement problems. Further,
the analysis applies to recyclable industrial hazardous wastes, like organic solvents, for which
deposit/refunds and subsidies have been suggested. 3 6
3
"For example, by Russell (1988) and Baumol and Mills (1985).
A number of empirical dimensions of recycling remain to be explored for auto batteries and
other applications of these policies. In particular, a better understanding of households' waste
disposal and recycling behavior will clarify issues that have been raised in this discussion. For
example, this analysis has assumed that disposal levies will be ineffective because they are
difficult to monitor, but in practice they may be successful in reducing disposal. Further
research on the extent of illegal disposal, and its sensitivity to disposal prices and the threat
of sanctions would be important for choosing policies. In addition, any distributional analysis
of recycling programs will require better evidence about the characteristics of households that
dispose or recycle.
40
A Policy comparisons with an additional sector
Suppose there are other uses for lead is addition to batteries, but lead is not recyclable in
these other uses.3" The market-clearing condition in terms of residual demand for virgin lead
(analgous to expression (3) in the text) is now
(1 - r(pR))Db(qb) + Do(qo) = V(pv),
where the o subscript refers to this other sector.
A.1 Simple analytics
Virgin materials tax A virgin materials tax raises the consumer price in both sectors, as
well as the price of recycled lead: qb = q, = PR = pv(1 + t). If the demand elasticity for lead
in other uses is eo, then the incidence of the virgin materials tax is:
dpv (ERR - E,(1 - r)Db(q) - coDo) dT
Pv ED(1 - r)Db(q) + coDo - ERR - evV T
where (1 - r)Db(q) is the demand for battery lead from households that do not recycle.38 The
private cost of the virgin materials tax is the same as in section 2:
dPCtax = -tpvdV. (22)
Deposit/refund A deposit/refund now differs from a virgin materials tax, because it only
raises the consumer price of lead used in batteries: qb = pv(1 + f) but qo = Pv, where f is the
level of the deposit/refund normalized by pv. (F = 1 + f). As before, the effective price to
recycling households does not change: q - ps = a, which implies pv(1 + f) = p,. The change
37Further uses in which the lead is recyclable will not alter the nature of the results in this section. Because
reprocessing costs are assumed to be constant, the amount recycled from other goods will not affect the cost
of recycling batteries.38In Db(q), the q is explicit because this is demand at the effective price of lead for households that do not
recycle, rather than q - ps, the effective price for those who do.
in price is now
dpv ERR - DE(1 - r)Db(q) dF (23)
pv ED(1 - r)Db(q) + foDo - ERR - EvV F
The private cost from the deposit/refund is now smaller than the virgin-materials tax at the
same intervention level:
dPCD/R = -pvfd((1 - r)Db(q)). (24)
Subsidy The subsidy remains very similar to its one-sector form: qb = qo = Pv and pv(l +
a) = PR. The resulting price change is
dpY ERR dA
v - ED(1 - r)Db(q) + EoDo - ýRR - EvV A '
with private cost
dPC" b " = apvdR. (26)
Recycled content standard (RCS) As mentioned in the text an ambiguity now arises
with the recycled content standard. In what follows RCS 1 (with permit price 7r1 ) is a standard
that applies only to batteries, creating the same implicit tax as a deposit/refund. For this
first RCS policy, assume that all the recovered lead was used in battery manufacture before
the policy intervention. The price change is
dpv ER, - e,(1 - r)Db(q) dr 2
=r (27)
pv E,(1 - r)Db(q)+ EoD 0 - ERR - eV - 2  (2
with private cost
dPCRCs1 = pvlr(( 1 - 1)dR - d(1 - r)Db(q)). (28)
r
RCS2 (with associated permit price r2) refers to a recycled content standard that applies to
all lead; it creates an implicit tax in both demand sectors. Now,
dpY ERR - ED(1 - r)Db(q)- EoDo d7r2  (
P (29)pV ED(1 - r)Db(q) + coDo - iER - evV 72
where p is the fraction of all lead that is recycled (as opposed to r, the fraction of batteries).
It has private cost
dPCRCS pvlr2(( 1 - 1)dR - dV). (30)
P
A.2 Policy comparisons
When the objective is to reduce battery lead disposal (that is, (1 - r)Db(q)) but not disposal
of lead in other uses, the policy comparsions in section 2.4 of the paper are altered as follows.
The level of intervention rankings are now
7rx < f. f < t, and f < a,
where f is the deposit/refund, t is the tax, a is the subsidy, and 7rx is the recycled content
standard that applies only to lead. The resulting private cost ranking is:
dPCD/R < dPCRc s ' < dPCsUb'; (31)
dPCD/R < dPCtQa; (32)
dPC"IR < dPCRCs2. (33)
(31) holds for the simple reason behind the results in the one sector model: a subsidy encour-
ages consumption of lead. The RCS on batteries only is essentially a revenue-neutral combina-
tion of a deposit/refund and a subsidy, so it lies between the two. In (32), the deposit/refund
is preferable to the virgin materials tax because it does not distort the non-battery sector.
For the same reason, the RCS on all lead (which is a revenue-neutral combination of a virgin
materials tax and subsidy) is more costly than the deposit/refund. Interestingly, it is not
possible to sign the difference between the virgin materials tax and and RCS 2: the subsidy
may reduce distortions in the other sector. 39
391If the policy objective is to reduce lead disposal in all uses, the virgin-materials tax and deposit/refund
should be switched in all of the comparison as should the two recycled content standards. The virgin-materials
A Data sources
Batteries: data on the number of replacement and original equipment batteries, exports
and imports, were taken variously from Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett (1987), Franklin
Associates (1989) and the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Number of original
equipment batteries previous to 1960 was inferred from motor vehicle sales during this
time.
Lead quantities: data for the amount of lead used for batteries recovered from batteries,
mine production and refined primary lead production are from U.S. Bureau of Mines
Minerals Yearbook, and Metallgeschellschaft, A.G. Metall Statistik. Lead for storage
batteries in industrial uses is reported by Franklin Associates and Minerals Yearbook
for recent years, but previous to 1967, it is assumed to be 10% of total lead used for
batteries.
Motor vehicles: motor vehicle de-registrations, cars in use, and motor vehicle sales are from
Motor Vehicle Manufactures Association, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures.
Prices: refined lead prices are the annual average U.S. producer prices for soft lead reported
in Metall Statistik. The price series for scrap batteries is the price per pound of whole,
drained used batteries paid by dealers in New York. It was gathered from daily price
reports in American Metals Market.
Other data: active duty military personnel is from Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Information on phase-out of lead in gasoline is from Anderson, et al (1989).
tax now address the correct margins, while the deposit/refund is too limited in scope.
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